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Bradley	 and	 Gulati	 (2014)	 we	 consider	 as	 our	 primary	 explanatory	 variable	 Vote%,	 the	 minimum	
percentage	of	bondholders	required	to	change	the	payment	terms	for	bond	i.		For	a	bond	that	requires	
unanimous	approval	 from	the	creditors	for	a	change,	Vote%	 is	coded	as	1.	 	Our	empirical	strategy	 is	to	































































































To	investigate	the	foregoing,	we	estimate	the	following	specification:											y%,) = α + βFVote	85% + βIVote	100% + γX%,) + θ% + ε%,)	 (2)	






















































































Variable	 Description	 Units/Scale	 Source	
Vote	 Minimum	 percentage	 of	 bondholders	 required	 to	 change	 the	 payment	
terms.	100%	is	coded	as	Vote=1	
Decimals	 Perfect	Info	
Vote	85	 =1	if	Vote=0.85,	=0	otherwise	 Binary	 Perfect	Info	
Vote	100	 =1	if	Vote=1,	=0	otherwise	 Binary	 Perfect	Info	
Bm	yield	 US	government	benchmark	yield	10YR		 %	(log)	 Datastream	
VIX	 VIX	Index,	settlement	price	 %	(log)	 Datastream	




CDS	 5YR	CDS	spread,	senior	unsecured	debt	with	CR	clause			 %	(log)	 Markit	
Resid	Mat	 Distance	to	maturity	 Months	(log)	 Bloomberg	
Coupon	 Annual	coupon	 %	 Bloomberg	











Variable	(unit)	 Mean	 Median	 5th	Perc.	 95th	Perc.	 N.	Obs.	
Bm	yield	(%,	log)	 0.858	 0.831	 0.496	 1.288	 330	
VIX	(%,	log)	 3.016	 2.978	 2.730	 3.449	 330	
BBB-AAA	Spread	(bps,	log)	 5.000	 5.056	 4.576	 5.397	 330	
Rating	(index)	 15.321	 14.333	 14	(B+)	 18	(CCC)	 330	
CDS	(%,	log)	 2.680	 2.347	 1.942	 4.157	 330	
Panel	B:	bond-level	variables	
Variable	(unit)	 Mean	 Median	 5th	Perc.	 95th	Perc.	 N.	Obs.	
Yield	(%,	log)	 2.737	 2.624	 2.247	 3.579	 4,188	
Vote		 0.823	 0.75	 0.75	 1	 13	
Resid	Mat	(months,	log)	 4.821	 4.889	 3.799	 5.687	 4,188	
Coupon	(%)	 9.194	 9.0	 6.0	 13.625	 13	
BA	Spread	(%)	 1.177	 0.840	 0.000	 4.221	 4,188	
	
Draft:	June	10,	2016	–	Forthcoming,	Capital	Markets	Law	Journal	(2016)	
Table	 3.	 Minimum	 vote	 thresholds	 and	 yield	 differentials.	 This	 table	 presents	 random	 (bond-level)	
effects	 regression	 results	 to	 examine	 the	 relation	 between	 the	minimum	 percentage	 of	 bondholders	
required	to	change	the	payment	terms	CAC	provisions	and	bond	yields.	The	sample	ranges	from	January	
4,	2010	to	April	29,	2016	and	includes	13	Venezuelan	bonds.	The	dependent	variable	is	weekly	log-yield.	




	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
	 	 	 	 	
Vote	 -0.685	 -0.778	 	 	
	 (0.529)	 (0.602)	 	 	
Vote	85	 	 	 0.011	 0.006	
	 	 	 (0.024)	 (0.044)	
Vote	100	 	 	 -0.091**	 -0.115*	
	 	 	 (0.046)	 (0.069)	
Bm	yield	 0.468***	 0.241***	 0.425***	 0.172***	
	 (0.027)	 (0.019)	 (0.021)	 (0.011)	
VIX	 0.481***	 0.214***	 0.433***	 0.146***	
	 (0.027)	 (0.029)	 (0.022)	 (0.023)	
BBB-AAA	Spread	 0.389***	 0.174***	 0.378***	 0.135***	
	 (0.039)	 (0.031)	 (0.039)	 (0.030)	
Rating	 0.256***	 	 0.279***	 	
	 (0.012)	 	 (0.016)	 	
CDS	 	 0.452***	 	 0.491***	
	 	 (0.022)	 	 (0.026)	
Resid	Mat	 -0.378***	 -0.422***	 -0.146***	 -0.186***	
	 (0.044)	 (0.055)	 (0.016)	 (0.019)	
Coupon	 0.009	 0.009	 0.016**	 0.016*	
	 (0.020)	 (0.024)	 (0.006)	 (0.009)	
Bid-Ask	Spread	 0.008	 0.008*	 0.010	 0.010	
	 (0.007)	 (0.004)	 (0.010)	 (0.006)	
	 	 	 	 	
Obs	 4,188	 4,188	 4,188	 4,188	
R-overall	 0.818	 0.848	 0.892	 0.944	
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7.75% Oct 2019-75% 7% Dec 2018-85%






































































Figure	 3.	 Venezuela	 credit	 quality.	Weekly	 time	 series	 of	 average	 rating	 across	 Fitch,	 Moody’s	 and	
Standard	&	Poor’s	(Rating,	left	axis)	and	5YR	CDS	spreads	(log	%,	right	axis).	
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